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 NOTE 
Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of 
Misapplied Sentencing Law 
State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) 
Alec D. Guy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal convictions often result in a restriction on the defendant’s free-
dom and a deprivation of the defendant’s liberty.  Given the gravity of these 
consequences, there are multiple procedures the court must follow not only in 
determining guilt but also in imposing a sentence.  Sentencing ranges are an 
essential component of criminal law.  In Missouri, sentencing ranges are found 
in statutes,1 and these statutes help trial judges determine what sentence to im-
pose.  Unfortunately, these guidelines can be incorrectly applied.  If these er-
rors are not addressed at the trial level, the appellate process can provide relief.  
However, interesting questions arise when the error is not preserved and courts 
are required to apply plain error review instead of the abuse of discretion stand-
ard. 
In State v. Perry,2 the Supreme Court of Missouri conducted plain error 
review of the application of an incorrect sentencing range.  The court held that, 
in order to prevail under plain error review, the defendant must prove the sen-
tence was based on a mistaken belief about the sentencing range.3  The court 
affirmed Perry’s sentence,4 even though the sentencing judge, the prosecutor, 
and Perry’s own counsel agreed upon the incorrect sentencing range.5  This 
Note analyzes the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning in Perry and consid-
ers the limited ability of defendants to obtain relief, both on direct appeal and 
in seeking postconviction relief, when the incorrect sentencing range is used 
but the error is not preserved for appellate review.  This Note argues the Su-
preme Court of Missouri should have created a rebuttable presumption of prej-
udice when an incorrect sentencing range is applied.  Finally, this Note posits 
 
* B.S. Political Science and Economics, Missouri Western State University, 2017; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2020.  I would like to thank Dean 
Litton for his insight and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Mis-
souri Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. See MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011 (2018); id. § 558.016. 
 2. 548 S.W.3d 292, 300–01 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 3. Id. at 301. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 297. 
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that judicial integrity, as well as public confidence in the judiciary, is under-
mined due to the result and implications of Perry. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Joseph Perry was charged with possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to distribute.6  This charge was based on Perry’s conversation with, 
and attempted escape from, a police officer.7  The officer noticed Perry backing 
out of his driveway and started following him.8  The police officer believed 
Perry’s license was suspended, but she was unable to verify this information as 
she followed him.9  Perry then reached his fiancé’s house and pulled into the 
driveway.10  The officer stopped, approached Perry, and asked to speak with 
him.11  Perry obliged, and the officer asked to see his license.12  After obtaining 
Perry’s license, the officer attempted to verify it was valid but could not do so 
because her radio was not functioning properly.13  During this time period, 
Perry began acting suspiciously.14  He reached into his pocket and took out 
what appeared to be a plastic bag.15  The officer asked Perry to come over to 
her.16  Instead, Perry took a bike out of the back of his truck and walked to the 
front of the vehicle, all while keeping the bag clenched in his fist.17  The officer 
followed Perry to the front of the vehicle, where he quickly threw down the 
bike and began running.18  Perry briefly hesitated when he came to a fence but 
then climbed over.19  Eventually, he surrendered, and a plastic bag of metham-
phetamine was found in the fence Perry scaled.20 
The prosecutor charged Perry with one count of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute.21  Perry filed a motion to suppress the meth-
amphetamine, arguing it was unlawfully seized because the police officer re-
quested his driver’s license without a reasonable suspicion Perry was engaged 
in criminal activity, but his motion was denied.22  A jury found Perry guilty of 
 
 6. Id. at 296–97. 
 7. Id. at 295. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 295–96. 
 12. Id. at 296. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 296–97. 
 22. Id. at 297. 
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the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance.23  During 
sentencing, the prosecutor stated the sentencing range was five to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment in the Department of Corrections and recommended an eight-
year sentence.24  The prosecutor noted Perry was not convicted of the charged 
crime but instead possession of a controlled substance,25 which is a class C 
felony carrying a sentencing range of one year in the county jail to seven years 
in the Department of Corrections.26  However, Perry was subject to enhanced 
penalties because he was deemed a persistent offender.27  The prosecutor ar-
gued the applicable range was still five to fifteen years, due to the enhanced 
penalties.28  Perry’s counsel did not object at the sentencing hearing29 but in-
stead agreed five to fifteen years was accurate.30  Yet, the correct range of pun-
ishment was one year in the county jail to fifteen years in the Department of 
Corrections because “[a]t the time of sentencing, only the maximum sentence 
increased for a persistent offender, while the minimum sentence was unaf-
fected.”31  Perry was then sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.32 
Perry first appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western Dis-
trict, but the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri after the 
Western District issued an opinion.33  There, Perry raised two arguments.34  He 
argued the trial court erred in sentencing him to eight years’ imprisonment be-
cause the court operated “under a materially false belief” regarding the sen-
tencing range.35  Further, he contended the trial court erred in overruling his 
motion to suppress the methamphetamine because he was unlawfully seized 
during his interaction with the police officer.36  The majority held the trial court 
did not err in sentencing Perry to eight years’ imprisonment37 or denying 
Perry’s motion to suppress.38  Consequently, the judgment of the trial court was 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 300. 
 27. Id.  A persistent offender is someone “who has been found guilty of two or 
more felonies committed at different times.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018). 
 28. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 297. 
 29. Id. at 300. 
 30. Id. at 297. 
 31. Id. at 300 (alteration in original). 
 32. Id. at 297. 
 33. State v. Perry, No. WD 78653, 2016 WL 6081854 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 
2016), aff’d, 548 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).  
 34. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 295. 
 35. Id. at 300. 
 36. Id. at 297. 
 37. Id. at 301. 
 38. Id. at 300.  Perry argued he had been unlawfully seized because the police 
officer requested his license without a reasonable suspicion that he had participated in 
criminal activity.  Id. at 297.  Based on the surrounding circumstances, the court held 
Perry was never seized and, as a result, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.  
Id. at 300.  Additionally, Judge Breckenridge, in her partial concurrence and partial 
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affirmed.39  The dissent agreed the trial court did not err in dismissing Perry’s 
motion to suppress but argued Perry established plain error regarding his sen-
tencing claim.40 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Sentencing law has become complex, and mistakes in applying sentenc-
ing law are common.  First, this Part briefly introduces Missouri sentencing 
law and explains the error committed in Perry.  Next, this Part details multiple 
Missouri cases that have addressed misapplications of sentencing law.  Finally, 
this Part examines how the federal appellate courts have applied plain error 
review to incorrect application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guide-
lines”). 
A. Missouri Sentencing Law 
In Missouri, the sentencing scheme is codified in the Revised Statutes of 
Missouri.41  These statutes provide the sentencing ranges for both misdemean-
ors and felonies,42 and the Supreme Court of Missouri has determined judges 
must impose a sentence within the specified range.43  Chapter 558 provides 
further guidance concerning other aspects of sentencing.44  For example, this 
chapter details the general rules for imposing multiple sentences and explains 
how the sentencing ranges are altered when the defendant is a prior or persis-
tent offender.45  Additionally, Missouri has established an eleven-member Sen-
tencing Advisory Commission (the “Commission”) that is responsible for var-
ious duties.46  For example, the Commission studies the sentencing practices 
of Missouri trial courts, determines if there are sentencing disparities based on 
social and economic statuses, and investigates alternative sentences as well as 
alternative programs.47  The Commission occasionally publishes a user guide.48  
Previously, the guide included a system of recommended sentences, but in 
 
dissent, agreed with the majority’s ruling that the trial court did not err in dismissing 
Perry’s motion to suppress.  Id. at 301 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).  This point will not be discussed further in this Note. 
 39. Id. at 301 (majority opinion). 
 40. Id. at 302 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 41. See MO. REV. STAT. ch. 558 (2018). 
 42. Id. § 558.011. 
 43. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 44. See MO. REV. STAT. § 558.026; id. § 558.016. 
 45. Id. § 558.026; id. § 558.016. 
 46. Id. § 558.019.6(1). 
 47. Id. § 558.019.6(2). 
 48. See MO. SENTENCING ADVISORY COMM’N, USER GUIDE 2015–2016 1 (2016), 
https://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=102733. 
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2012, section 558.019 was amended to remove this requirement of the Com-
mission.49 
Missouri sentencing law imposes an increased range of punishment for 
defendants found to be persistent offenders – that is, individuals “who [have] 
been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times.”50  At 
the time of Perry’s sentencing, the statute only increased the maximum term of 
imprisonment to the next felony level.51  Unfortunately, trial courts, much like 
the trial court in Perry, were increasing both the minimum and maximum sen-
tence, which led to the application of an erroneous sentencing range.52  The 
applicable statute has since been amended.  Missouri’s sentencing scheme now 
provides that persistent offenders who are sentenced to a class B, C, D, or E 
felony must be sentenced at the “authorized term of imprisonment for the of-
fense that is one class higher than the offense for which the person is found 
guilty.”53  Consequently, both the maximum and minimum punishment will 
increase for persistent offenders. 
B. Missouri Case Law 
One of the leading Missouri cases addressing an incorrect application of 
sentencing law is Wraggs v. State.54  There, the defendant was sentenced to 
thirteen years’ imprisonment for a conviction of assault with intent to maim 
with malice.55  Wraggs was convicted under the Habitual Criminal Act, and the 
judge explicitly referenced Wraggs’ prior convictions at sentencing.56  Wraggs 
had previously been convicted of two robberies.57  Those convictions were later 
vacated, and Wraggs pleaded guilty to one count of robbery instead of two.58  
Based on this change, Wraggs filed a motion to set aside the sentence in the 
assault case, arguing the thirteen-year sentence was founded on an illegal and 
 
 49. Id.  Compare id. § 558.019.6 (2012), with id. § 558.019.6 (2011). 
 50. Id. § 558.016.3. 
 51. Id. § 558.016.7 (2013).  The statute stated that 
 
[t]he total authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for a persistent offender 
or a dangerous offender are: (1) For a class A felony, any sentence authorized 
for a class A felony; (2) For a class B felony, any sentence authorized for a class 
A felony; (3) For a class C felony, any sentence authorized for a class B felony; 
(4) For a class D felony, any sentence authorized for a class C felony. 
 
Id. 
 52. See State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 53. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018). 
 54. 549 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1977) (en banc). 
 55. Id. at 882. 
 56. Id. at 882–83. 
 57. Id. at 883. 
 58. Id. 
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invalidated conviction.59  The trial court denied the motion because the convic-
tion was based on a prior burglary conviction, not the robbery convictions.60 
The Supreme Court of Missouri determined the sentence had to be set 
aside because it depended on “assumptions concerning [Wraggs’] criminal rec-
ord which were materially untrue.”61  The court explained the trial judge be-
lieved Wraggs had been convicted of five felonies when he had only been le-
gally convicted of three felonies.62  The rationale was that the sentence “might 
have been different if the sentencing judge had known that at least two of (ap-
pellant’s) previous convictions had been (illegally) obtained.”63  The court de-
termined that on the record before it, “the conclusion [wa]s inescapable that 
the sentencing judge . . . took into consideration ‘the totality’ of appellant’s 
prior convictions, including the two 10-year robbery sentences later invali-
dated.”64  Ultimately, the thirteen-year sentence was vacated, and the case was 
remanded for resentencing.65 
Since Wraggs, the Missouri appellate courts have decided various cases 
where the trial court has misstated or misapplied sentencing law, and the courts 
often reach different results – sometimes plain error is found and sometimes it 
is not.  When a mistake is not preserved, the appellate court can only review 
for plain error.66  Relief will be granted under this standard only if “the alleged 
error so substantially affects the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice 
or miscarriage of justice inexorably results if left uncorrected.”67  Further, 
“[m]anifest injustice is determined by the facts and circumstances of the case, 
and the defendant bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice.”68 
In State v. Elam, the defendant was convicted of first-degree statutory 
rape and first-degree statutory sodomy.69  Elam was sentenced to fifteen and 
ten years, respectively, and the sentences were to run consecutively.70  On ap-
peal, Elam argued the court committed plain error in imposing consecutive 
sentences because the State contended consecutive sentences were mandatory 
when, in fact, they were not.71  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern 
District explained that if “the trial court imposed consecutive sentences instead 
of concurrent sentences based on a misunderstanding of the law, such conduct 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972)). 
 64. Id. at 884. 
 65. Id. at 886. 
 66. State v. Severe, 307 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
 67. State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (citing State v. 
Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)). 
 68. State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (citing State v. 
Mayes, 63 S.W.3d 615, 624 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)). 
 69. 493 S.W.3d 38, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 70. Id. at 40. 
 71. Id. at 42. 
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is plain error and the defendant is entitled to re-sentencing,” but if the sentence 
was imposed based on other valid considerations, resentencing is not re-
quired.72  Here, the trial court considered that Elam’s crimes were serious and 
ongoing and that he had a fairly clean criminal record when the sentence was 
imposed.73  Because the court believed the sentences were based on these con-
siderations and not a mistake regarding the law, the court held Elam did not 
establish plain error.74 
The same result was reached in State v. Scott.75  There, the defendant ar-
gued the trial court plainly erred in imposing consecutive sentences because 
the judge incorrectly believed consecutive sentences were required.76  The 
court stated no error would be found if the consecutive sentences were imposed 
based on valid considerations, like severity of the crimes.77  The court deter-
mined the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively because of 
proper considerations.78  Specifically, after the prosecutor stated the consecu-
tive sentences appeared to be required, the judge asked for the defense’s posi-
tion, and the defense argued the court had discretion in sentencing.79  Then, the 
judge “commended the courage shown by the victims and commented that he 
believed the jury appropriately recommended life sentences.”80  All of this 
showed the judge exercised independent discretion when he imposed the con-
secutive sentences; the judge did not simply rely on the prosecutor’s misinter-
pretation of the statute.81 
In other instances, appellate courts have found plain error when the trial 
judge has misstated or misapplied sentencing law.  In State v. Olney, Olney 
was convicted of first-degree assault and armed criminal action.82  The trial 
court sentenced him as a persistent offender and imposed consecutive ten-year 
sentences.83  Olney argued the trial court committed plain error in imposing 
consecutive sentences because the judge believed consecutive sentences were 
 
 72. Id. at 43. 
 73. Id. at 44. 
 74. Id.  Further, the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District has found plain 
error where the minimum sentence was improperly calculated and the defendant was 
given the minimum sentence.  State v. Troya, 407 S.W.3d 695, 700–01 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2013) (finding defendant’s “sentence was passed on a mistaken belief that he was sub-
ject to a minimum term of ten years’ imprisonment” and remanding under plain error 
review). 
 75. 348 S.W.3d 788 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 76. Id. at 799. 
 77. Id. at 800. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. 954 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), abrogated by State v. Pierce, 548 
S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 83. Id. 
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mandatory.84  Yet, the armed criminal action statute did not require consecutive 
sentences.85  The State argued prejudice was not shown because the trial court 
would have imposed the same sentence even in the absence of a mistaken be-
lief.86  The State reinforced that during sentencing, the judge noted the “hor-
rendous” nature of Olney’s past crimes and advised Olney’s counsel not to seek 
the minimum sentence because that “was not a reasonable argument here.”87  
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District acknowledged the 
State made a strong argument but determined remand for resentencing was ap-
propriate because sentencing is the trial court’s responsibility and the Western 
District did not want to interfere with the lower court’s authority.88 
A similar result was reached in State v. Cowan.89  In that case, the defend-
ant was found guilty of burglary and stealing.90  Similar to Perry, Cowan was 
found to be a prior and persistent offender, which impacted his possible pun-
ishment.91  Due to this designation, the trial court determined Cowan would be 
subject to the Class A sentencing range of ten to thirty years.92  The minimum 
sentence, however, remained at the Class B level, regardless of the enhance-
ment, and should have been five years.93  The court remanded the case for re-
sentencing, noting the trial court never addressed the mistake or showed 
Cowan’s sentence was based on the correct range.94 
As the cases discussed above illustrate, the Missouri appellate courts have 
taken different approaches in conducting plain error review of misapplied sen-
tencing law.  An analysis of these Missouri cases shows the appellate court’s 
plain error review can result in one of three outcomes: (1) refusal to remand 
under plain error review because the sentencing judge listed other valid con-
siderations that served as a basis for the sentence, (2) remand under plain error 
review because the sentence was based on a mistaken belief, or (3) remand 
 
 84. Id. at 699–700. 
 85. Id. at 700. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 701.  Missouri appellate courts have remanded for plain error in similar 
situations.  See, e.g., State v. Summers, 456 S.W.3d 441, 446–47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) 
(finding plain error where the trial court thought an armed criminal action sentence 
must run consecutive and remanding for resentencing on the same basis as Olney), ab-
rogated by State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2018) (en banc); State v. Powell, 380 
S.W.3d 632, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (finding plain error where the record implied the 
trial court believed consecutive sentences were mandatory), abrogated by Pierce, 548 
S.W.3d 900.  
 89. 247 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008), abrogated by Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 
900. 
 90. Id. at 618. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 619. 
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under plain error review even if there were other valid reasons given by the 
trial court. 
State v. Pierce,95 the companion case to State v. Perry, involved a convic-
tion for one count of possession of child pornography and a sentence of fifteen 
years’ imprisonment.  Pierce claimed his sentence was based on a “materially 
false understanding of the possible range of punishment,” as the court stated 
the incorrect range of ten to thirty years at sentencing.96  Possession of child 
pornography is a class B felony with a range of punishment of five to fifteen 
years.97  Pierce was found to be a persistent offender, which increased the max-
imum punishment to that of a class A felony or thirty years.98  However, at the 
time Pierce was convicted, the minimum punishment did not increase to the 
class A minimum of ten years but instead remained at five years.99  As a result, 
the permissible range of punishment for Pierce was five to thirty years instead 
of ten to thirty years.100 
Pierce failed to object to this error during sentencing, and consequently, 
he asked for plain error review.101  The Supreme Court of Missouri explained 
that “[a] sentence passed on the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due 
process of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the question 
of punishment in the light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual out-
come.”102  However, the court in Pierce determined the trial court’s mistaken 
belief regarding the applicable sentencing range did not alone entitle a defend-
ant to relief under plain error review.103  To prevail, the defendant must show 
the trial court sentenced him based on the mistaken belief.104  In support of this 
holding, the court noted the invalidated convictions in Wraggs “played a sig-
nificant part” in the sentencing judge’s decision.105  Further, the majority ex-
plained Missouri courts of appeal do not remand cases for resentencing if the 
sentences imposed by the trial court were unaffected by the mistaken sentenc-
ing range and were based on other valid considerations.106 
Unlike Wraggs, where the court found the defendant showed his sentence 
“might have been different” if not for the judge’s mistaken belief regarding his 
prior convictions,107 the court ultimately determined Pierce did not show the 
sentence was founded on the trial court’s mistake regarding the permissible 
 
 95. 548 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 96. Id. at 903. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 903–04. 
 101. Id. at 904. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 905. 
 105. Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Wraggs, 549 S.W.2d at 883 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 
448 (1972)). 
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sentencing range.108  In fact, the trial court mentioned several factors before 
pronouncing the sentence and acknowledged these factors were the foundation 
for the sentence.109  As a result, Pierce was unable to show the manifest injus-
tice required to establish plain error.110 
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Patricia Breckenridge 
argued the majority in Pierce ignored the manifest injustice that results when 
a judge sentences a defendant while misunderstanding the range of punish-
ment.111  In addition, Missouri courts have consistently found plain error when 
the judge misstates the sentencing range on the record or where the judge in-
correctly believed the law required consecutive sentences – even if the court is 
reviewing for plain error.112  Judge Breckenridge contended the cases the ma-
jority cited were distinguishable from Pierce because those cases involved the 
prosecutor misstating the law and the record did not show the trial court relied 
on those errors.113  Judge Breckenridge further argued Wraggs created a differ-
ent standard than the one articulated by the majority.114  In Wraggs, the court 
determined “[t]he pertinent question is whether the sentence was predicated on 
misinformation; whether the sentence might have been different if the sentenc-
ing judge had known that at least two of appellant’s previous convictions had 
been illegally obtained.”115  As a result, Judge Breckenridge argued, the test 
should be “whether the sentence might have been different had the [trial] 
court’s sentence not been predicated on the mistaken sentencing range.”116 
In addition, the sentencing court must abide by the statutorily approved 
range of punishment.117  Judge Breckenridge noted that, because of this, the 
sentencing range inherently affects the sentence and a different sentence might 
have resulted if the trial court knew of the correct sentencing range.118  Finally, 
Judge Breckenridge argued the standard the majority created is nearly impos-
sible for defendants to meet, as relief will only be afforded if the sentencing 
judge states the incorrect sentencing range is the basis for the sentence.119  For 
these reasons, Judge Breckenridge would have vacated the sentence and re-
manded the case for resentencing.120 
 
 108. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d at 906. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 907 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 907–08. 
 114. Id. at 908. 
 115. Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)). 
 116. Id. at 908–09. 
 117. Id. at 909. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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C. Federal Case Law 
The federal circuit courts have taken different approaches in cases where 
the Guidelines have been incorrectly applied.  The United States Sentencing 
Commission (the “U.S. Commission”) first submitted guidelines to Congress 
on April 13, 1987, and the Guidelines took effect later that year.121  The U.S. 
Commission can submit amendments to Congress every year, and these 
changes take effect after 180 days, unless Congress enacts a contrary law.122  
The U.S. Commission must “prescribe guideline ranges that specify an appro-
priate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by coordinating 
the offense behavior categories with the offender characteristic categories.”123   
Sentencing courts are required to select a sentence within the appropriate range, 
but a court can depart from the recommended range if the case presents atypical 
features.124  The court must specify the reasons for a departure from the Guide-
lines.125  When reviewing a sentence within the recommended range, an appel-
late court determines whether the Guidelines were applied correctly.126  If the 
lower court did not issue a sentence within the specified range, the appellate 
court decides whether a departure from the appropriate range was reasona-
ble.127  However, a different standard of review is used when the alleged error 
is not preserved at the trial level. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit will find plain error when 
the error is “clear or obvious” and has impacted “substantial rights.”128  To 
show substantial rights were affected in the sentencing context, defendants 
must show there is a reasonable probability they would have received a lower 
sentence if the correct range had been used.129  Even if this is shown, the ap-
pellate court still has discretion in providing relief, which will be exercised 
“only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.’”130 
In United States v. Davis,131 the defendant was five months into a super-
vised release term when he violated the terms of his release.  The district court 
used a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty-one months, but the correct range 
was six to twelve months.132  At sentencing, the district court mentioned, 
 
 121. U.S.  SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2018 2 (2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/GLMFull.pdf. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. United States v. Davis, 602 F.3d 643, 647 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 
(2009)). 
 131. Id. at 645. 
 132. Id. at 645–46. 
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among other circumstances, that Davis had only completed five months of the 
five year supervised release term, that Davis had a firearm, and that some of 
his possessions showed he intended to resume the conduct that led to his orig-
inal conviction.133  The Fifth Circuit noted the district judge imposed a sentence 
higher than even the incorrect maximum (twenty-four months) and determined 
the district court had “ample independent bases for imposing the sentence that 
it did . . . .”134  As a result, Davis did not meet the reasonable probability stand-
ard.135  Further, given the circumstances of the supervised release violation, the 
court held the imposition of the twenty-four-month sentence did not have a 
serious effect on the “fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial pro-
ceedings.”136 
Before 2016, the Fifth Circuit imposed an additional burden on the de-
fendant in certain circumstances.  If the correct and incorrect sentencing ranges 
overlapped and the defendant’s sentence fell within the common ground of the 
ranges, the defendant had to provide additional evidence to show substantial 
rights had been affected.137  When a sentence fell within both the correct and 
incorrect sentencing range, the Fifth Circuit showed “‘considerable reluctance 
in finding a reasonable probability that the district court would have settled on 
a lower sentence.’”138  Further, in the Fifth Circuit, casual statements by the 
sentencing judge were deemed insufficient to show a reasonable probability of 
a different result.139  The court determined the additional evidence rule was 
sensible, as the imposed sentence was within the correct range.140  However, in 
Molina-Martinez v. United States,141 the United States Supreme Court rejected 
the additional evidence rule.  The Court explained the Guidelines are “the sen-
tencing court’s ‘starting point and . . . initial benchmark.’”142  Given their cen-
tral role in the sentencing process, Guidelines errors can be serious, and the 
district court commits a serious procedural error when the Guidelines are mis-
calculated.143 
 
 133. Id. at 648. 
 134. Id. at 649. 
 135. Id. at 650. 
 136. Id. at 651 (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). 
 137. United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 290 (5th Cir. 2011).  A defendant 
could meet the reasonable probability standard, without additional evidence, if “(1) the 
district court mistakenly calculates the wrong Guideline range, (2) the incorrect range 
is significantly higher than the true Guideline range, and (3) the defendant is sentenced 
within the incorrect range.”  Id. at 289. 
 138. United States v. Blocker, 612 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Campo-Ramirez, 379 Fed. App’x 405, 409 (5th Cir. 2010), abrogated by 
United States v. Sustaita-Mata, 728 Fed. App’x 402 (5th Cir. 2018)). 
 139. Id. at 416–17. 
 140. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d at 290. 
 141. See 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). 
 142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 
(2007)). 
 143. Id. at 1345–46 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). 
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Referencing various statistics that illustrated how courts use the Guide-
lines, the Court, in Molina-Martinez, explained, “[T]he Guidelines are not only 
the starting point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also the lode-
star.”144  Thus, if the defendant shows the court used an incorrect, higher sen-
tencing range, reasonable probability of a different outcome has likely been 
shown.145  However, in some circumstances, even in the presence of an incor-
rect, higher sentencing range, a reasonable probability of prejudice might not 
be apparent.146  For example, the record might include an explanation that 
shows the judge imposed the sentence due to other independent factors.147  Ab-
sent such circumstances, prejudice is shown if the defendant can establish an 
incorrect, higher sentencing range was applied.148  The Court further noted de-
fendants will often not be able to show additional evidence because judges 
rarely articulate how the Guidelines have impacted the sentence.149  Therefore, 
the cases where the Guideline range had an impact are the least likely to have 
additional evidence.150  Ultimately, because the Guideline range will affect a 
sentence in most cases, the Court held defendants are allowed to rely on this 
fact when trying to show a reasonable probability that a different sentence 
would have been imposed under the correct Guidelines, which  “is needed to 
establish an effect on substantial rights for purposes of obtaining relief under 
[plain error].”151 
Other circuits, however, have been more lenient in their plain error re-
view.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explains plain error 
requires “a defendant [to] show that (1) the district court erred; (2) the error 
was plain; (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the 
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”152  If there is an “obvious misapplication of the sentencing guide-
lines,” the third and fourth elements of plain error are normally satisfied.153  
The court noted that “the Guidelines are intended to, and do, affect sentenc-
ing.”154  In fact, the court explained the entire purpose of the Guidelines is to 
 
 144. Id. at 1346. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1347. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  In fact, the United States Supreme Court has specifically “told judges that 
they need not provide extensive explanations for within-Guidelines sentences because 
‘[c]ircumstances may well make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the Com-
mission’s own reasoning.’”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v. United States, 
551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007)).  Additionally, appellate courts can presume a sentence 
is reasonable, if it falls within the correctly calculated Guideline range.  Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 1349. 
 152. United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (quoting United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
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impact substantial rights by assisting the district court in determining how 
much liberty the defendant must relinquish to the government.155 
Additionally, the Guidelines operate as a starting point, and if the starting 
point is incorrect, there is a reasonable probability the final result is incor-
rect.156  Regarding the fourth prong of the Tenth Circuit’s test, a reasonable 
citizen’s view of judicial integrity would likely be diminished when a court 
does not fix an error of its own creation that could lead to a longer prison sen-
tence.157  This is particularly true in circumstances where the correction would 
not be difficult, as the “district court [only needs] to exercise its authority to 
impose a legally permissible sentence.”158  Due to the above considerations, 
the Tenth Circuit determined “[a] presumption that the third and fourth prongs 
are met by obvious [G]uidelines errors is . . . sensible . . . .”159  However, this 
presumption can be overcome if the sentencing judge makes a “fortuitous com-
ment” that shows the Guidelines error did not negatively impact the final sen-
tence.160 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has created a presumption 
of prejudice in these cases as well.161  The United States Supreme Court has 
explained that in some cases, where specific prejudice cannot be shown, a pre-
sumption of prejudicial error is warranted.162  The Third Circuit articulated two 
reasons for creating a presumption in this scenario.163  First, “the Guidelines 
are intended to, and do, affect sentencing.”164  Second, determining the effect 
of an incorrect Guideline range without a “fortuitous comment” from the sen-
tencing judge will be difficult.165  The practical impact of this presumption is 
that “a sentence based upon a plainly erroneous Guideline range will ordinarily 
be remanded so that the [d]istrict [c]ourt may exercise its discretion to choose 
an appropriate sentence based upon the correct range, unless the record shows 
that the sentence was unaffected by the error.”166 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1334. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 162. Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 208.  Other courts have reached similar results and remanded for resen-
tencing when the district court erred in calculating the Guideline range.  See United 
States v. Vargem, 747 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We have held that when a sen-
tencing judge incorrectly calculates the Guideline[] range, potentially resulting in the 
imposition of a greater sentence, the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights and 
‘the fairness of the judicial proceedings.’”); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171 
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding that remand is appropriate where an incorrect Guideline range 
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IV. INSTANT DECISION 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Perry contended he was 
sentenced “under a materially false belief” regarding the permissible sentenc-
ing range.167  Under Wraggs, “[a] sentence passed on the basis of a materially 
false foundation lacks due process of law and entitles the defendant to a recon-
sideration of the question of punishment in the light of the true facts, regardless 
of the eventual outcome.”168  The court explained that, under plain error review, 
Perry must show the trial court’s sentence was based on the mistaken belief 
regarding the sentencing range.169  Thus, the trial court holding a mistaken be-
lief about the sentencing range is not enough.170  Here, the majority found Perry 
did not show the sentence was based on the judge’s mistaken belief.171  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri emphasized that the trial court did not sentence 
Perry to the minimum sentence but instead followed the prosecutor’s recom-
mendation of eight years.172  In making the recommendation, the prosecutor 
discussed Perry was not a candidate for probation and emphasized his prior 
felony convictions.173  Perry was unable to meet his burden, and as a result, the 
majority affirmed the trial court’s judgement.174 
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Breckenridge disa-
greed with the holding that the trial court did not err in sentencing Perry.175  
Judge Breckenridge explained Missouri courts have consistently found plain 
error when the trial court misstated the sentencing range on the record.176  Here, 
the trial court misstated the range, incorrectly asserting it was five to fifteen 
years in the Department of Corrections.  The correct range was between one 
year in the county jail and up to fifteen years in the Department of Correc-
tions.177 
Judge Breckenridge argued the fact Perry was not sentenced to the mini-
mum punishment is immaterial.178  The true question is “whether the sentence 
might have been different.”179  Judge Breckenridge contended that knowledge 
of the correct range is a prerequisite to imposing a sentence and an incorrect 
 
was used, “unless [there is] reason to believe that the error did not affect the district 
court’s selection of a particular sentence”). 
 167. State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 168. Id. at 301 (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en 
banc)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 301 (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 176. Id. at 302. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (quoting Wraggs v. State, 549 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)). 
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range could impact the sentence.180  Due process does not allow a court to im-
pose a sentence predicated on a materially false premise, like application of an 
incorrect sentencing range, and entitles the defendant to “reconsideration of the 
question of punishment in light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual out-
come.”181  Judge Breckenridge argued the majority ignored these due process 
considerations and created an almost impossible burden by requiring one to 
show the sentence was based only on a mistaken belief as to the applicable 
sentencing range.182  Finally, Judge Breckenridge asserted that “[i]mposing [a] 
sentence upon a mistaken belief as to the range of punishment is manifestly 
unjust and results in plain error.”183  Therefore, according to Judge Brecken-
ridge, Perry’s sentence should have been vacated and the case should have been 
remanded for resentencing.184 
V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Perry greatly hinders a de-
fendant’s chances of obtaining relief under plain error review when the trial 
court uses an incorrect sentencing range.  The specific sentencing error in Perry 
is no longer possible because the statute was amended in 2018 to provide that 
persistent offenders are sentenced using the range of “the offense that is one 
class higher than the offense for which the person is found guilty” rather than 
just increasing the maximum sentence.185  However, sentencing judges can still 
make a mistake regarding the applicable sentencing range.  Further, there are 
many nuances in Missouri’s sentencing scheme, and the holding of Perry can 
apply to other misapplications of sentencing law.  For example, many of the 
Missouri appellate court cases discussed above address alleged errors regard-
ing the imposition of consecutive sentences.  First, this Part analyzes the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Perry and argues the court’s ra-
tionale is flawed.  Second, this Part discusses the heavy burden created by 
Perry as well as the difficulty of meeting this burden.  Third, this Part considers 
the possibility of defendants seeking postconviction relief when mistakes in 
sentencing are made but determines most defendants will be unsuccessful in 
obtaining this sort of relief.  Ultimately, this Part concludes that relief of any 
kind is improbable, and due to this, judicial integrity, as well as public confi-
dence in the judicial system, is undermined by the plain error standard set forth 
in Perry. 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (quoting Wraggs, 549 S.W.2d at 884). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.016.7 (2018). 
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A. Reasoning of the Supreme Court of Missouri 
The Supreme Court of Missouri determined Perry did not establish his 
sentence was based on the mistaken belief held by the trial court.186  In justify-
ing this conclusion, the court noted that the trial judge did not enter the mini-
mum possible sentence and the trial judge was following the prosecutor’s rec-
ommendation.187  At sentencing, the prosecutor indicated the range of punish-
ment was five to fifteen years and argued that, due to Perry’s actions and crim-
inal history, he was not eligible for probation.188  The prosecutor then recom-
mended an eight-year sentence.189 
First, the court’s reliance on the fact the trial judge followed the prosecu-
tor’s recommended sentence is misplaced.  As stated above, the prosecutor er-
roneously believed the range of punishment was five to fifteen years.190  The 
correct range of punishment was one year in the county jail to fifteen years in 
the Department of Corrections.191  Thus, even the prosecutor was operating 
under a mistaken belief regarding the applicable sentencing range.  The prose-
cutor did mention some considerations aside from the sentencing range, such 
as Perry’s actions and criminal history, but these were referenced to reject the 
possibility of probation.192  Additionally, the prosecutor explicitly referenced 
the range when recommending the sentence.193  As a result, the prosecutor’s 
recommendation could have been skewed, which would, in turn, impact 
Perry’s sentence because the court followed this recommendation. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri further determined the defendant’s sen-
tence must be based on the mistaken belief to establish manifest injustice,194 
but, given the importance of the range of punishment, a miscalculation could 
have an adverse impact on the sentence even if there are other reasons for the 
sentence.  The range of punishment plays a large role in the determination of a 
sentence, and Missouri should follow in the footsteps of the federal courts.  The 
United States Supreme Court has explained the “Guidelines [are the] starting 
point and initial benchmark . . .” of sentencing.195  Additionally, the central 
purpose of the Guidelines is to impact sentencing.196  As a result, federal courts 
 
 186. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 301 (majority opinion). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id.  The prosecutor stated, “I believe that Mr. Perry’s actions indicate that he’s 
not a candidate for probation.  His history indicates the same.”  Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.; see also State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 906 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 195. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 39 (2007). 
 196. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001). 
17
Guy: Uncorrected Injustice: Plain Error Review of Misapplied Sentencin
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
530 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
have determined an error in calculating the Guideline range can negatively im-
pact the sentence.197  In fact, miscalculation of the Guideline range is a “signif-
icant procedural error.”198  The federal courts have reached this conclusion 
even though the Guidelines are not the only consideration in imposing a sen-
tence and district judges can impose sentences outside of the applicable 
range.199 
In Missouri, the statutory sentencing range arguably has an even larger 
impact than in the federal court system.  As Judge Breckenridge’s partial con-
currence and partial dissent in Pierce noted, “a defendant must be sentenced 
within the statutorily approved range of punishments.”200  Unlike sentencing at 
the federal level, Missouri judges are bound to follow the statutory range of 
punishment.  As a result, trial court judges carefully consult the permissible 
range when imposing a sentence even if there are other considerations.  Those 
further considerations simply explain where a specific sentence falls within the 
range.201  As Judge Breckenridge noted, “[t]he correct range of punishment, 
therefore, is an essential predicate to imposing any sentence, and sentencing a 
defendant when mistaken as to that applicable range inherently affects the sen-
tencing process and might lead to a different sentence.”202  Thus, if the trial 
court only holds a mistaken belief regarding the sentencing range, rather than 
basing the sentence on the mistaken belief, the error can “so substantially af-
fect[] the rights of the accused that a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice 
inexorably results if left uncorrected,”203 which successfully establishes a claim 
for plain error.  Additionally, the fact Perry’s sentence fell within the correct 
range of punishment is immaterial.  Given the importance of Missouri’s sen-
tencing guidelines, the sentence could still be impacted by the erroneous range.  
As the Third Circuit has explained, an individual “has a right to a sentence that 
 
 197. See United States v. Story, 503 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent 
that this starting point was incorrect (a lower-end sentence of 346 months as opposed 
to 324 months), it is certainly possible that the overall sentence was incorrect as well.”). 
 198. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
 199. Id. at 49–50. 
 200. State v. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d 900, 909 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (Breckenridge, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 
(Mo. 2013) (en banc)). 
 201. Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 234 n.2  (“Under section 557.036.3, the responsibility for 
‘assessing and declaring’ a defendant’s punishment in Missouri rests with the jury, un-
less the defendant waives this procedure or the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is a repeat offender in one of the categories excluded by section 
557.036.4(2).  After the jury makes this determination (and in all cases when jury sen-
tencing is not applicable or the jury is unable to agree), the trial court imposes a sen-
tence (within the statutorily approved range of punishments) that is appropriate under 
all the circumstances.  In doing so, however, the trial court may not impose a greater 
sentence than the punishment assessed and declared by the jury (provided it was within 
the authorized range) and, if the jury assesses and declares a punishment below the 
lawful range, the trial court must impose the minimum lawful sentence.”). 
 202. Pierce, 548 S.W.3d at 909. 
 203. State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 300–01 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
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not only falls within a legally permissible range, but that was imposed pursuant 
to correctly applied law.”204  Even though Perry’s sentence is within the legally 
prescribed range, there is doubt as to whether the law was correctly applied.  
Consequently, Perry should have another sentencing hearing, which will at 
least ensure the law is truly understood and applied accurately. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri explained Perry was not sentenced to the 
misstated minimum sentence but instead to a longer eight-year sentence.205  
Yet, considering the importance of the sentencing range and the lack of evi-
dence as to why the court imposed this sentence, this should not be determina-
tive.  The Supreme Court of Missouri does not list any reasons provided by the 
trial court that show the same sentence would have been imposed if the correct 
range was used.206  The trial court or the prosecutor could have arrived at their 
sentences by seeking the middle of the range, which would render the final 
result erroneous because an incorrect range used.  The fact that the trial court 
did not impose the minimum sentence does not necessarily show the sentence 
was not based on the incorrect range.  Sentencing, at least to some degree, must 
be a function of the permissible range because judges are required impose a 
sentence within the statutory guidelines.207  Without additional explanation, it 
is difficult to determine with any certainty that the sentence would not have 
been altered if the correct range was used. 
B. Difficulty of Burden 
The test the Supreme Court of Missouri established creates a burden 
nearly impossible for defendants to meet, and consequently, many defendants 
will be denied the relief they deserve.  To avoid this injustice, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri should instead adopt the rebuttable presumption test used in 
the federal appellate courts.  The United States Supreme Court has posited sen-
tencing judges rarely explain how the Guidelines impact their decisions.208  
Further, the Third Circuit has determined it is difficult to ascertain the impact 
of an erroneous Guideline range in the absence of a “fortuitous comment” from 
the sentencing judge.209  Thus, the Third Circuit adopted a rebuttable presump-
tion of prejudice, unless the record contains evidence demonstrating the error 
did not impact the sentence.210  The United States Supreme Court has deter-
mined that, in most cases, if the defendant can show the trial court used an 
incorrect, higher Guideline range, the defendant has established a reasonable 
 
 204. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 205. Perry, 548 S.W.3d at 301. 
 206. See id. 
 207. State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 234 n.2 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 208. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2016).  This fact 
played an important role in the Court’s decision to invalidate the Fifth Circuit’s “addi-
tional evidence” test, as that test failed to account for “the dynamics of federal sentenc-
ing.”  Id. 
 209. Knight, 266 F.3d at 207. 
 210. Id. at 208. 
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probability of a different outcome, which satisfies the federal standard for prej-
udice.211  Yet, in some circumstances, a reasonable probability of prejudice 
might not exist.212  For example, the record could show the trial court thought 
the sentence was appropriate, regardless of the sentencing range.213 
In Missouri, however, a defendant must show the trial court imposed a 
sentence based on the mistaken belief in order to obtain relief under plain error 
review.214  Judge Breckenridge argues this burden can really only be met when 
the defendant shows “he or she was sentenced solely on a mistaken belief as to 
the applicable sentencing range,” which will be nearly impossible.215  Given 
the realities of sentencing, the approaches used by the United States Supreme 
Court and the Third Circuit are more appropriate.  Often, a defendant will not 
be able to meet the test the Supreme Court of Missouri established because the 
sentencing judge might not explain why he or she is imposing a sentence.  
Perry demonstrates this problem, as there is no explanation regarding the sen-
tence.216  The trial court simply followed the prosecutor’s recommendation 
without detailing the reasons for the sentence.217  Given this difficulty, a rebut-
table presumption is more just.  Under such a presumption, the defendant 
would need to show the wrong sentencing range was used; then, the prosecutor 
could turn to the record to establish there was truly no prejudice.218 
Judicial economy is often cited as justification for creating a high bur-
den.219  The fear is that a remand for resentencing will consume precious judi-
cial resources.220  However, resentencing is not nearly as costly as retrial.221  
As a result, fewer judicial resources will be consumed if these cases are re-
manded.  Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
used limited remand in these cases,222 which can save some judicial resources.  
For this procedure, the appellate court simply asks the district court to go on 
the record and state whether a different sentence would have been imposed had 
the judge known of the correct sentencing range.223  The method used by the 
 
 211. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1346–47. 
 214. State v. Perry, 548 S.W.3d 292, 301 (Mo. 2018) (en banc). 
 215. Id. at 302 (Mo. 2018) (en banc) (Breckenridge, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
 216. Id. at 301 (majority opinion). 
 217. Id. 
 218. United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 219. See Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2016). 
 220. Id. 
 221. United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[R]emand 
for resentencing, while not costless, does not invoke the same difficulties as a remand 
for retrial . . . .”); see also United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1334 (10th 
Cir. 2014) (determining the cost of correction is small because the defendant need not 
be released or retried). 
 222. United States v. Currie, 739 F.3d 960, 967 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 223. Id. 
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Seventh Circuit can provide relief to the defendant and establish finality re-
garding the sentence, all at a limited cost.  While judicial economy is an im-
portant concern for courts, the limited cost of resentencing and potential alter-
natives for this process provide a cost-efficient method for addressing this in-
justice; not to mention the cost of resentencing is a small price to pay to ensure 
an individual is not unjustly deprived of his or her personal liberty by being 
required to serve a longer sentence than is otherwise necessary. 
C. Lack of Relief 
As discussed above, a heavy burden is placed on a defendant, and this 
burden will often be difficult to meet on plain error review.  If direct appeal 
fails, a defendant can then seek postconviction relief.224  The Missouri Supreme 
Court Rules allow a convicted felon to challenge the ruling by “claiming that 
the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of this 
state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel . . . .”225  Perry was analyzed under 
plain error review because Perry did not object at the sentencing hearing.226  
Perry can likely bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the 
failure to object as well as his counsel’s statement the sentencing range was 
correct.227  To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, the defendant must 
comply with the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.228  He or she “must 
demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and 
diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation[] 
and (2) he or she was prejudiced by that failure.”229  The defendant must estab-
lish these criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.230 
There is a strong presumption that the conduct of the counsel was effec-
tive and reasonable.231  To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test and de-
feat this presumption, the movant must “identify ‘specific acts or omissions of 
counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of 
professional competent assistance.’”232  Perry can likely meet this heavy bur-
den, as failure to object to, and ratification of, an incorrect sentencing range 
likely does not constitute professional competent assistance.  Regarding the 
second prong, “Prejudice occurs when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
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been different.’”233  Based on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning, this 
will be a difficult showing for Perry.  The court determined Perry failed to show 
his sentence was based on the materially false belief regarding the applicable 
sentencing range.234  The court determined Perry was not given the minimum 
sentence and the trial court followed the prosecutor’s recommendation.235  
Based on this determination, a showing of prejudice does not seem possible.  If 
Perry’s sentence was not based on the mistaken belief, but instead other factors, 
the outcome would not have been different had the sentencing judge imposed 
the correct range because those other factors are likely still present.  If more 
evidence exists, Perry could introduce new evidence in a postconviction relief 
proceeding.  However, this is unlikely because the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing is the strongest evidence in this case, and the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri had access to this on appeal.  For these reasons, Perry will likely fail on 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and once again, his relief will be 
denied. 
D. Judicial Integrity and Public Confidence 
The lack of relief for Perry seriously hinders judicial integrity and public 
confidence.  The federal courts have frequently addressed how the application 
of an incorrect sentencing range impacts “the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
utation of judicial proceedings,” as this is a factor of the federal plain error 
analysis.236  Multiple federal courts have stated that sentencing a defendant in 
the wrong Guideline range strongly influences the public’s perception of the 
judiciary and the justness of the result.237  The Tenth Circuit has provided 
thoughtful analysis in this area: 
[W]hat reasonable citizen wouldn’t bear a rightly diminished view of 
the judicial process and its integrity if courts refused to correct obvious 
errors of their own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger 
longer in federal prison than the law demands?  Especially when the 
cost of correction is so small?  A remand for resentencing, after all, 
doesn’t require that a defendant be released or retried but simply allows 
the district court to exercise its authority to impose a legally permissible 
sentence.238 
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The same concerns apply at the state level.  In Perry, the prosecutor ar-
gued the incorrect range of punishment, the trial judge adopted this range, and 
the defense counsel thought the sentencing range was correct, all of which re-
sulted in an eight-year sentence.239  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
allowed this error to stand by affirming the decision of the trial court.240  Fur-
ther, as explained above, postconviction relief is unlikely.  A reasonable citizen 
could certainly have less respect for, and confidence in, the judicial process 
given these circumstances.  The law was not followed, and, consequently, 
Perry might be subjected to a longer sentence as well as a more serious depri-
vation of liberty.  “The fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our judicial 
system demand that we correct . . .” some types of sentencing errors.241  In 
situations like Perry, the demand is strong.  Not only was the law incorrectly 
applied but also no other reasons were advanced for the imposed sentence.242  
Perry should have an opportunity for relief.  Even if the same result is pro-
duced, at least the new sentence will result from a correct application of the 
law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In State v. Perry, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not grant relief under 
plain error review even though the trial judge used the incorrect sentencing 
range.  The court’s decision places a heavy burden on defendants and, in most 
cases, eliminates defendants’ opportunities to obtain relief.  As a result, an ob-
vious error, which could adversely impact Perry’s prison sentence, has been 
allowed to stand.  Not only is Perry hurt by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
decision but also public confidence in the judicial system is rightly diminished.  
After all, reasonable citizens can easily have a lesser view of the judicial system 
when courts refuse to correct errors they ultimately created.243  Perry, and fu-
ture similarly situated defendants, should have a “right to a sentence . . . that 
[is] imposed pursuant to correctly applied law.”244  In Missouri, however, it 
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